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Quality and Outcomes Framework: what have we
learnt?
OPEN ACCESS
Martin Roland and Bruce Guthrie assess the successes and failures of the pay-for-performance
scheme and what its future should be
Martin Roland professor of health services research 1, Bruce Guthrie professor of primary care
medicine 2
1Institute of Public Health, Cambridge CB2 0SR, UK; 2Population Health Sciences, University of Dundee, Dundee, UK
In 2004 the UK National Health Service introduced the largest
health related pay-for- performance scheme in the world—the
Quality and Outcomes Framework (QOF).1 However Scotland
is now abandoning the scheme, and growing disenchantment
in England is likely to lead to major changes. What have we
learnt, and what should happen to QOF in future?
Promising start
In the late 1990s, general practitioners’ pay had fallen
substantially behind that of specialists, and morale and
recruitment in general practice were poor. The government and
the British Medical Association (BMA) privately agreed that a
large pay rise was needed. Money was available because in
2000 the government had committed to increasing NHS
spending to mid-European levels as a percentage of gross
domestic product. However, the profession had to give
something in return, and the BMA dropped its longstanding
opposition to “quality payments” and started to negotiate a
pay-for-performance scheme that would substantially increase
funding for general practice.
There followed 18 months of negotiations between BMA and
NHS Employers with a small number of clinical advisers to
develop the outcome measures (indicators) that would form the
basis of the scheme (box 1). A starting premise was that the
clinical indicators should be based on evidence based guidelines
so that they would be likely to command a wide degree of
professional support (box 2). The framework also included
indicators related to practice organisation and patient
participation. The package was controversial, and the BMA
allowed its members to vote on the scheme—once in outline
and once when the details were known.
Implementation happened over more than a year. The indicators
were available well before the financial rewards were introduced
in order to facilitate planning, investment in electronic clinical
records with tools for managing chronic disease, the production
of detailed guidance for practices, and support for
implementation in some parts of the country. Electronic clinical
records, which were already well advanced in primary care,
became universal because they were needed to obtain payment,
though GPs had to employ more administrative staff to collect
the required data. QOF accelerated existing trends to shift care
for chronic physical conditions to nurse-led clinics, particularly
diabetes and cardiovascular and respiratory disease. Practices
used the software tools created for QOF payments to monitor
their care of patients, with more internal management in
practices to ensure they met the targets.2
High payments
With an overall cost of over £1bn (€1.2bn; $1.3bn), QOF proved
nearly £300mmore expensive than the government had expected
in the first year because it underestimated the baseline quality
of care. This meant that many practices achieved near maximum
performance (and therefore payment) in the first year. Practice
income rose rapidly with QOF potentially providing an
additional 25% of income, and this certainly reduced
professional opposition to the scheme. However, initial rises in
income were progressively clawed back over the next 10 years
with zero or near zero pay rises such that real terms income in
2013-14 fell back to below that in 2003-04.3
All data fromQOFwere publicly available, and thus three major
innovations were introduced simultaneously: much better data
collection, public release of information on quality of care, and
pay for performance. It is therefore unclear what effect the first
two of these would have had on their own, and the degree to
which pay for performance was a quality driver.
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Box 1: How the Quality and Outcomes Framework works
• The original scheme included 76 clinical indicators covering 10 conditions
• Data on clinical quality were extracted automatically from practice electronic records
• Doctors could exclude patients from individual clinical indicators (exception reporting) for specified reasons including clinical
inappropriateness, intolerance of medication, and patient dissent
• Organisational indicators included medical records, information for patients, education and training, practice management, and
medicines management
• Patient experience indicators related to conducting and acting on the results of patient experience surveys and offering booked
appointments of at least 10 minutes
Box 2: Examples of indicators that attracted broad professional support
• Percentage of patients aged ≥45 who have a record of blood pressure in the preceding five years
• Percentage of patients with coronary heart disease in whom the last blood pressure reading (measured in the preceding 12 months)
is ≤150/90 mm Hg
• Percentage of diabetic patients with up-to-date influenza immunisation
The government decided that it would be discriminatory to put age limits on the indicators even though most of the available
evidence was based on trials that excluded older people. As time went on, and with targets having largely been met, single
disease indicators appeared less relevant to the needs of patients, particularly older people with multiple complex problems.
Did QOF improve quality of care?
QOF did produce some improvements in quality of care, but
this was against a background of a widespread programme of
quality improvement in the NHS that included national standards
for the major chronic diseases, annual appraisal of all doctors
working in the NHS, and widespread use of clinical audits to
compare practices, sometimes with public release of data. So
for asthma and diabetes, for example, the introduction of QOF
was followed by a modest increase in the rate at which care was
already improving.4 For the major chronic diseases in QOF,
there were also reductions in inequalities in delivery of care,
with practices in socioeconomically deprived areas rapidly
catching up with the performance of practices in more affluent
areas.5 The scheme may have limited the rise in emergency
admissions for included conditions, but did not appear to reduce
associated mortality.6-8
Quality of care for conditions that were not included also
continued to improve, but at a slower rate than before the
introduction of QOF.9 There were almost certainly negative
consequences—for example, the progressive decline in the
ability of patients to see a GP of their choice was probably partly
due to a relentless focus by government on incentives for rapid
access to care.
Did doctors cheat?
Gaming and manipulation of data are hard to detect, and the
planned “light touch” inspections were in practice lax. The
government’s concern had been about one aspect of the
scheme—the ability of doctors to exclude individual patients
from the data (exception reporting) for a range of reasons,
including their clinical judgment. This had been important to
get professional support for the scheme, but the government
saw it as an open invitation to game the system. This proved
not to be the case, with only around 5% of patients reported as
exceptions, though, as would be expected, rates of exception
reporting were lower for simple processes such as measuring
blood pressure and higher for more complex processes such as
diagnosis and intermediate outcomes.10 11
What went wrong with QOF?
QOF remains one of the largest implementations of healthcare
pay-for-performance in the world, and any programme on this
scale will experience difficulties. Over the years, there have
been several technical problems, one of which is that the original
payment formula unintentionally led to larger and more affluent
practices getting systematically higher payments than smaller
practices for the same level of quality.12 A second major
technical flaw was that payments based on responses to a
national patient survey were subject to random variation such
that practices could improve care from one year to the next but
actually receive less money.13
Problems also occurred with some indicators after
implementation. For example, the codes used to define diabetes
registers were changed to include only records that stated the
type of diabetes. Although intended to improve the quality of
registers, some people with less specific diabetes codes
effectively vanished from practices’ QOF registers, and these
people may subsequently have received worse care.14 Many of
these problems could have been avoided by better testing of
indicators before implementation, which eventually happened
when the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
(NICE) took over development of indicators in 2009.
Although the initial indicators largely related to aspects of care
that GPs already thought important, the alignment of indicators
with professional values reduced over time. This was partly
because the easy targets had already beenmet and new indicators
were introduced that were evidence based but had only marginal
gains despite high workload. In addition, an increasing
proportion of QOF was taken up with indicators that met a
managerial or policy agenda rather than a clinical one (table).
There was also concern that the needs of the increasing
population of older people with multiple complex problems
were poorly served by indicators that focused exclusively on
single diseases.
The maximum percentage of practice income linked to quality
indicators was reduced from 25% to 15% in 2013 because of
perceptions that the higher rate distorted clinical practice. More
radically, GPs in one English district (Somerset) negotiated a
complete alternative to QOF in 2015 and Scotland droppedQOF
in 2016 in favour of a quality improvement scheme based on
local “quality circles.”
The unpopularity of QOF among professionals has undoubtedly
been increased by the administrative burden it produces at a
time when GPworkloads have been increasing, general practice
has been receiving a declining share of the NHS budget, and
work stress is higher than at any time in the last 15 years.15
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So what should happen now?
There is general agreement that it is a professional responsibility
to maintain and improve quality of care but less agreement on
how this should be done. Although there is consensus that QOF
requires substantial change, evidence is conflicting on whether
quality declines when pay-for-performance incentives are
removed.16 17 It would therefore be prudent to require some
limited ongoing data collection to avoid serious adverse
consequences of withdrawing financial incentives. There is also
little evidence on what would work better, although the steady
improvement in quality of care in the decade preceding QOF
suggests that the development and implementation of guidelines
and standards encouraged by local clinical audit is effective.
The NHS in Scotland has chosen this approach, replacing QOF
with “quality circles” implemented through clusters of 10-15
practices working collaboratively to identify and develop
relevant improvement work. There is funding to release GPs
from practices but no centrally created targets or financial
incentives. Similar work is ongoing in Wales.
The successes of QOF included an acceleration of previous
trends towards systematic management of chronic disease by
multidisciplinary teams and widespread introduction of
electronic medical records. However, quality and safety
improvement require multiple strategies, sustained over time.
Winning hearts and minds through persuasion, collaboration,
and close alignment of professional and managerial agendas is
at least as important as the more technical elements of any
individual quality improvement initiative. QOF (and pay for
performancemore generally) was not a magic bullet to improve
quality and reduce variation, but neither will its replacements
be. It remains to be seen which of the divergent approaches
being taken by the NHS in England, Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland is most successful.
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Key messages
The Quality and Outcomes Framework accelerated previous trends towards widespread use of electronic medical records and
multidisciplinary management of chronic diseases
QOF resulted in relatively limited additional improvements in quality but reduced socioeconomic inequalities in delivery of care
Several indicators were withdrawn because they lacked professional support or there were problems with implementation
New strategies are needed to continue improvements in quality of care
Table
Table 1| Examples of indicators that went wrong
ProblemIndicator
Insufficient survey numbers and a poorly constructed formula linking survey scores to payment
resulted in substantial random variation in payments (introduced in 2008, dropped in 2011)
Patient survey reports of whether patients could get
appointments
Poor alignment with professional beliefs prompted substantial criticism about lack of supporting
evidence (although other indicators with similar levels of evidence that GPs did believe in were not
criticised in the same way). It was also easily “gamed” by GPs using free text description of the
patient’s problem rather than coding “depression” in electronic records (introduced in 2006, dropped
in 2013)
Using a validated instrument (PHQ9) to assess the severity of
depression within 28 days of a new diagnosis, repeating the
assessment 2-12 weeks following diagnosis
Practices could effectively claim payments by including a register with one obese patient. The
indicator does not encourage regular weighing to create a more comprehensive obesity register
or any strategy for tackling the problems of obesity (introduced in 2006, still current)
Practices should develop a register of patients with obesity
Little professional support, substantial concern about harms resulting from false positive results,
lack of services for specialist diagnosis and management (introduced in 2014, dropped in 2015)
Opportunistic screening of elderly and at-risk patients for
dementia (technically an “enhanced service” rather than part
of QOF)
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